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Rape is an exceptional area of criminal law.  The offense is a 
serious one,1 yet defined without any mens rea requirement beyond 
general intent.2  Moreover, if the supposed victim consents, the object of 
the required general intent – sexual penetration – is not just permitted by 
the criminal code, but protected by the Constitution.3  We can forgive 
our first-year students some confusion when they try to line up the law 
of sexual assault with canonical tributes to the requirement of mens rea 
in our law.4 
∗  Professor of Law, University of San Diego.  B.A. Northwestern (1980), J.D. Michigan (1983).   
 1. See, e.g., Payne v. Ward, 21 Fed. App’x 852, 854 (10th Cir. 2001) (rejecting habeas 
petitioner's Eighth Amendment challenge to a sentence of 502 years on multiple rape convictions 
based on attacks of the same victim on twelve occasions).  Less dramatic but still serious penalties 
attend less aggravated cases.  Illustrative are sentences imposed by trial courts on rape charges that 
were subsequently reversed on appeal because proof of force was insufficient.  See, e.g., People v. 
Denbo, 868 N.E.2d 347, 358 (Ill. App. 2007) (reversing the conviction and seven year prison 
sentence of a defendant, who shoved her hand into her lover's vagina, was pushed away, then 
inserted hand again); Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1341-43 (Pa. Super. 1992) 
(sentencing a defendant, whose conviction was ultimately reversed in Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 
641 A.2d 1161, 1166 (Pa. 1994), to one to four years in prison). 
 2. Some jurisdictions excuse reasonable mistakes about consent, but they are a distinct 
minority and still impose severe penalties for simple negligence.  See infra text accompanying notes 
20-22. 
 3. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that substantive due process 
protects noncommercial sexual intimacy in private between consenting adults). 
 4. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (“The contention that an 
injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It 
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If the substantive law, with its harsh penalties, low threshold for 
criminal responsibility, and focus on the consent vel non of the victim is 
odd, the procedures attending rape prosecutions remain unique.  Where 
once the prosecution labored to overcome prior sexual history evidence, 
now it is the defense that must counter expert testimony and character 
evidence, without the benefit of the victim-character-evidence rule that 
homicide and assault defendants may exploit.5  The old rape 
exceptionalism of privileged predation has given way to a new 
exceptionalism.  We have compromised supposedly fundamental 
principles of criminal responsibility and procedural fairness to improve 
the efficiency of law enforcement. 
This essay explores the new rape exceptionalism.  My thesis holds 
that rape exceptionalism is rooted in a divide between elite opinion, 
reflected in statutes, court decisions, and academic commentary, and 
popular opinion, as reflected in jury verdicts.  Elite opinion values 
sexual autonomy and suspects, when it does not despise, sexual 
aggression.  Popular opinion supposes that sexual autonomy may be 
forfeited by female promiscuity or flirtation, and views male sexual 
aggression as natural, if not indeed admirable. 
The substantive law is now phasing out the force requirement, with 
the objective of imposing criminal liability in those cases, typically 
acquaintance-rape cases, where the victim did not consent but the 
accused did not inflict or threaten serious bodily injury extrinsic to the 
sex act.  Like the new exceptionalism in procedure, the substantive turn 
to consent aims to enable successful prosecution of men who commit 
what elite opinion regards as a serious crime, and what popular opinion 
regards as nature taking its course. 
If an explicit statement be required, in the rape context (if not in 
some others, e.g., gun control) elite opinion is right and popular opinion 
is wrong.  The turn to consent, however, is essentially lawless, because 
there is no determinate and widely-shared understanding of what 
constitutes consent.  It will result in prosecutorial discretion to bring rape 
charges against men in far more cases than the system can manage, for 
wrongdoing that the legislature’s intent to punish seems very doubtful. 
If the rules of procedure enabled prosecutors to convict the great 
majority of those they choose to charge, the turn to consent might 
normalize rape law.  In the “normal” criminal justice system, jury trial is 
is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a 
consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.”). 
 5. See infra notes 32, 36, and 37. 
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an exotic departure from plea bargaining.  In plea bargaining, 
prosecutors have plenary discretion to select charges from a vast menu 
of possible charges supplied by legislatures, enabling prosecutors to 
make functionally coercive plea offers.6  In effect, criminal liability is 
determined by prosecutors, with some judicial input at the sentencing 
stage.7 
The turn to consent, however, has not and will not normalize the 
law of rape.  Even with expansive reception of expert testimony for the 
prosecution, the admissibility of character evidence against the 
defendant, and the ban on character evidence about the victim, clever 
defense lawyers are able to play on popular opinion and invite 
nullification of the legislature’s facial prohibition of sex without consent.  
Expanding the formal scope of the substantive law to cover cases where 
 6. Professor Davis, a leading expert on the problem of prosecutorial discretion, describes the 
normal process as follows: 
Prosecutors decide whether and how to charge an individual.  They decide whether to 
offer a plea to a lesser charge, set the terms of the plea, and assess whether the conditions 
have been met.  In federal and state jurisdictions governed by sentencing guidelines, 
these decisions often predetermine the outcome of a case since the sentencing judge has 
little, if any, discretion in determining the length, nature, or severity of the sentence.  The 
defendant certainly has the option of exercising her right to trial and leaving her fate in 
the hands of the jury or judge, but often she is not willing to run the risk of additional 
and more serious convictions and more prison time.  Consequently, in most jurisdictions, 
plea bargaining resolves more than ninety percent of all criminal cases.  Prosecutors on 
both the state and federal levels control this process. 
Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 
IOWA L. REV. 393, 408-09 (2001) (footnotes omitted). 
 7. Professor Davis is a former public defender.  Judge Lynch, a former prosecutor, has 
described the normal process in strikingly similar terms: 
To me, the essence of this practice, and what radically distinguishes it from the 
adversarial litigation model embodied in textbooks, criminal procedure rules, and the 
popular imagination, is that the prosecutor, rather than a judge or jury, is the central 
adjudicator of facts (as well as replacing the judge as arbiter of most legal issues and of 
the appropriate sentence to be imposed).  Potential defenses are presented by the 
defendant and his counsel not in a court, but to a prosecutor, who assesses their factual 
accuracy and likely persuasiveness to a hypothetical judge or jury, and then decides the 
charge of which the defendant should be adjudged guilty.  Mitigating information, 
similarly, is argued not to the judge, but to the prosecutor, who decides what sentence 
the defendant should be given in exchange for his plea. 
If I am correct in this description of the prevailing process, the defining characteristic of 
the existing “plea bargaining” system is that it is an informal, administrative, 
inquisitorial process of adjudication, internal to the prosecutor's office – in absolute 
distinction from a model of adversarial determination of fact and law before a neutral 
judicial decision maker. 
Gerard E. Lynch, Comment: Screening Versus Plea Bargaining: Exactly What are we Trading Off?, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 1399, 1403-04 (2003). 
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even elite opinion is divided, such as the proposal to require affirmative 
expressions of consent,8 is an academic exercise. 
If we really want to normalize rape law, we must bypass the jury 
openly.  We can’t conceal the bypass under the fig leaf of plea 
bargaining, because defense lawyers know that juries are unlikely to 
convict.  The Supreme Court permits such a bypass.  “All” does not 
mean “all,” at least in the Sixth Amendment.  There’s a catch; for 
convictions rendered without a right to jury trial, the maximum penalty 
is six months in jail.9  That might seem to trivialize the offense,10 but it 
is infinitely more than the nothing whatsoever that happens in most 
acquaintance rape cases. 
Those of us who regard the “normal” operation of the criminal 
justice system with suspicion would still object to the concentration of 
power in prosecutorial hands and the routine punishment of exercising 
constitutional rights.  If that’s the best system of social control our 
society can achieve, however, it makes at least as much sense in rape 
cases as it does in drug cases.  If and when we find ways to force elected 
representatives to make the hard choices about the substantive law, and 
to provide a fair, accurate, and affordable day in court for every 
defendant, we will have time to ask what the just punishment should be 
for sex without consent.  Until then a special sex crimes court, sitting 
without a jury but with no jurisdiction to exceed the Supreme Court’s 
six-month limit, makes sense as a prosecutorial option to the standard 
felony process. 
I.  RAPE EXCEPTIONALISM 
Anglo-American law always has treated rape differently than other 
serious crimes.  In the last three decades, however, the nature of that 
exceptionalism has changed.  Under the common law and statutes 
derived from it, a conviction could be had only when the victim resisted, 
 8. For such proposals, see STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF 
INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF THE LAW 271 (1998) ("For such [sexual] intrusions actual 
permission – nothing less than positive willingness, clearly communicated – should ever count as 
consent."); Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1407 (2005) ("[T]he 
law should define ‘rape’ as engaging in an act of sexual penetration with another person when the 
actor fails to negotiate the penetration with the partner before it occurs."). 
 9. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1970) (upholding New York system of 
bench trials for misdemeanors against Sixth Amendment challenge). 
 10. For the argument equating sex-without-consent-without-force with sex-without-consent-
with-force, see Michelle J. Anderson, All-American Rape, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 625 (2005).  For 
my case against such equations, see Panel Discussion: Men, Women and Rape, 63 FORD. L. REV. 
125, 139-141 (1994). 
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complained promptly, and was of “good fame.”11  The defense could 
prove prior sexual acts, as well as reputation for promiscuity.12  These 
rules, which had no counterpart in prosecutions for other crimes such as 
robbery, discouraged reporting and made convictions difficult even in 
clear cases. 
Beginning in the 1970’s, a reform movement swept away the old 
rape exceptionalism.13  The old exceptionalism, however, was not 
replaced with normalcy.  The old exceptionalism had reflected the 
perceived danger of false accusations, especially when brought by 
lower-class women against upper-class men.14  The new exceptionalism 
reflects the difficulty of persuading juries to convict, especially in two 
categories of cases prosecutors have trouble winning — cases in which 
the victim and the defendant have a prior social relationship, and cases 
in which the victim engaged in some sort of socially-recognized sexual 
misbehavior.15 
The elimination of the resistance requirement created a new 
peculiarity in rape law.  At common law, rape was a general intent 
crime; the defendant only needed to intend penetration.16  Since 
penetration does not occur by accident, there was no mens rea 
requirement with respect to the victim’s non-consent.  The resistance 
requirement, however, stood in for mens rea.  If the victim physically 
resisted, the defendant was put on notice of the absence of consent, at 
least absent exotic and creepy facts such as those in the notorious 
Morgan case.17 
With the end of the resistance requirement, the legal treatment of 
 11. 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN, 633 (1646).   
 12. For the common-law rules, see id. at 628-35. 
 13. For an overview of the first reform movement, see, for example, SCHULHOFER, supra note 
8, at 17-40. 
 14. See, e.g., HALE, supra note 11, at 634 (claiming that rape is “an accusation easily to be 
made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so 
innocent”).  After the abuse poured on this quotation for the last thirty years, I cannot help 
imagining Lord Hale indulging a grim smile as he watched TV coverage of the Duke Lacrosse affair 
from judicial Valhalla. 
 15. See infra text accompanying notes 57-61, and 63. 
 16. See, e.g., David P. Bryden, Forum on the Law of Rape: Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. 
L. REV. 317, 325 (2000) ("At common law, rape was a ‘general intent’ crime: The requisite 
intention was merely to perform the sexual act, rather than to have nonconsensual intercourse.") 
(footnotes omitted). 
 17. See D.P.P. v. Morgan, 1976 A.C. 182 (finding that victim's husband represented to 
defendants that victim enjoyed being sexually attacked and that defendants should understand 
victim's verbal and physical resistance as indications of consent; held, defendants would not be 
guilty of rape if they believed husband's representations, upholding conviction on ground that no 
jury could credit defendants' claim of such sincere belief). 
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non-consent as a strict liability element in a general intent crime made 
rape a very strange felony indeed.  Ordinarily, a general intent crime 
carries with it the standard common law rule that a reasonable mistake 
negates general intent.18  Even on the level of theory, however, this 
move implies a reasonable mistake defense only about intercourse, not 
about consent.19 
Only a minority — but a substantial minority — of U.S. 
jurisdictions endorse this per se prohibition of instructing the jury on any 
defense of mistake about consent.20  Other jurisdictions recognize a 
reasonable-mistake-about-consent defense, typically by statute, but these 
defenses, only recently recognized at all, have been cut back 
dramatically in their application.  California, the fountainhead of the 
defense, now requires “substantial evidence of equivocal conduct that 
would have led a defendant to reasonably and in good faith believe 
consent existed where it did not.”21  The typical defendant who testifies 
that the alleged victim consented in fact is thus denied an instruction on 
the mistake defense.  By contrast, the standard instruction on self-
defense directs the jurors to acquit if the accused either acted in justified 
self-defense or honestly and reasonable believed that he did so.22 
Even where the defense is available, it has the effect of making 
grave criminal liability turn on simple negligence.  A mistake is 
unreasonable when it would not have been made by a reasonable 
person.23  There is no language in the opinions or the instructions about 
 18. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 155-56 (3d ed. 2001). 
 19. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lopez, 745 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Mass. 2001) ("Although the 
Commonwealth must prove lack of consent, the ‘elements necessary for rape do not require that the 
defendant intend the intercourse be without consent.’ . . . Historically, the relevant inquiry has been 
limited to consent in fact, and no mens rea or knowledge as to the lack of consent has ever been 
required.") (citations omitted). 
 20. See id. at 968-69 (citing decisions from Illinois, Iowa, Maine, New Hampshire, 
Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin). 
 21. People v. Williams, 841 P.2d 961, 966 (1992).  For an explanation of the significance of 
this qualification, and the argument that it is wrong on principle, see Rosanna Cavallaro, Criminal 
Law: A Big Mistake: Eroding the Defense of Mistake of Fact About Consent in Rape, 86 J. Crim. L. 
& Criminology 815, 815-16 (1996). 
 22. See People v. Watie, 124 Cal. Rptr.2d 258, 270-71 (Cal. App. 2002). 
The instructions given to the jury in connection with the murder charge and the 
instructions on self-defense and imperfect self-defense required the jury to consider and 
resolve defendant's claims of mistake of fact.  The impact of the defendant's actual and 
reasonable belief, even if it was mistaken, was fully described by [the pattern self-
defense instructions]. . . . The court thus had no sua sponte duty to provide a separate 
mistake-of-fact instruction. 
Id. 
 23. See, e.g., In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183, 187 (2003) (deciding whether post-penetration 
revocation of consent made continued penetration rape:  the Court found "no reasonable person in 
6
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negligent mistakes being criminally negligent, no language about “gross 
negligence” or “gross deviation from the standard of care that a 
reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.”24 
Thus, liability for rape may be imposed for the same type of 
culpability that customarily exposes the actor to civil liability for injuries 
caused in an automobile accident (and many jurisdictions are less 
generous than that).  What explains this aspect of the new 
exceptionalism?  The explanation is straight-forward: the defense would 
be rarely justified but often claimed, inviting juries to acquit the guilty. 
To the extent that the force requirement is read as retaining the 
resistance requirement in some form, the common-law arrangement still 
does a passable job of reconciling rape law with standard mens rea 
doctrine.  The force requirement, however, is in the process of erosion.  
In jurisdictions where that erosion is far advanced, the accused faces 
decades in prison, and the stigma of being branded a rapist, for an 
offense in which the only required intent is the intent to have sex.  
Lawrence v. Texas25 has the practical effect of making rape a strict-
liability crime, as the intent to have consensual sex may not be punished 
as a crime.26  The common-law judges could say that the defendant 
knew he was committing fornication or adultery (the marital exemption 
making non-adulterous, non-fornicative sex legal even when forced), 
and so deserved no sympathy.27  In the modern world of element 
analysis of criminal statutes,28 and the presumption against strict 
liability, rape law became an outlier.  After Lawrence, it has become an 
extreme outlier.29 
defendant's position would have believed that Laura continued to consent to the act") (citing 
Williams, 841 P.2d at 965-66). 
 24. Cf.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(d). 
 25. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (holding state statute prohibiting same-
gender oral and anal sex unconstitutional). 
 26. See id. at 578 (“[I]ndividual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of 
their physical relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of ‘liberty’ 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Moreover, this protection 
extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married persons.”). 
 27. Cf. Regina v. Prince, L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154 (1875) (convicting defendant of taking 
underage female from her father, rejecting defendant's mistake of age consent because even if 
victim were over sixteen, defendant's conduct was still wrongful). 
 28. See Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: 
The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681 (1983) (contrasting offense analysis, 
which mechanically used a single culpable mental state for all non-mental elements of charged 
offenses, with element analysis which assumes that there must be some, but not always the same, 
degree of culpability for each of the non-mental elements). 
 29. Professor Loewy makes the point with respect to mistake of age in statutory-rape cases, 
but the point holds for mistake of consent in forcible rape cases.   E.g., Arnold H. Loewy, Statutory 
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Another reason behind the denial of any mistake defense is the 
tension between the defense and the rape shield laws.  If the defendant 
testifies that he formed his belief in the victim’s consent based in part on 
what he had heard about her sexual propensities, or his reaction to her 
provocative attire, he can argue that the prohibition on such evidence in 
the shield law goes only so far as barring the evidence on the issue of 
consent in fact.  If the evidence is relevant to show a belief however 
mistaken, he may have a constitutional trump on the shield law.30 
The shield laws31 themselves are a distinct point of rape 
exceptionalism.  While the prohibition on past act evidence to show 
propensity to consent reflects generally applicable doctrine,32 the 
prohibition on reputation and opinion evidence does not.  In a homicide 
case, for example, the defense may support a self-defense claim with 
proof that the deceased had an aggressive character, and that the 
defendant knew of specific acts of violence by the deceased.33  The 
explanation again is straightforward: admitting character evidence would 
Rape in a Post Lawrence v. Texas World, 58 S.M.U. L. REV. 77, 90 (2005): 
But post-Lawrence, the landscape should change.  In bygone days, we could say to [the 
defendant]: ‘You knew that you were doing something wrong.  The fact that your wrong 
was greater than you anticipated will not avail you.  If you didn't want to take a chance, 
you could have abstained from sexual intercourse entirely.’  Today, [the defendant] 
would answer: ‘But what I believed I was doing was a constitutional right.  Perhaps 
some people may consider it immoral, but that doesn't matter.  The nation's fundamental 
charter protects what I reasonably thought I was lawfully doing.’ 
Id.  The claim, discussed by Professor Loewy, to a constitutional right to a mistake defense, by 
analogy to the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, is debatable.  It would be difficult, however, 
to deny the proposition that Lawrence has undercut any reconciliation of modern rape law with 
bedrock principles of criminal responsibility, even if we conclude that those principles are not 
constitutionally enforceable. 
 30. See Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43, 48 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding reputation of victim 
known to defendant admissible to show belief in consent).  Cf. Michael John James Kuzmich, 
Review of Selected 1998 California Legislation: Evidence: Chapter 127 Prevents Evidence of 
Victim's Manner of Dress in Rape Cases to Prove Consent, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 637 (expressing 
concern that manner-of-dress evidence might be admissible to support mistake defense); Sakthi 
Murthy, Comment: Rejecting Unreasonable Sexual Expectations: Limits on Using a Rape Victim's 
Sexual History to Show the Defendant's Mistaken Belief in Consent, 79 CAL. L. REV. 541, 544 
(1991) (arguing that mistake founded on past sexual history is not reasonable). 
 31. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412. 
 32. See, e.g., id. 404(a) ("Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not 
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion . . . ."). 
 33. See, e.g., id. 404(a)(2): 
[Admitting that] [i]n a criminal case, and subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 412, 
evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of 
peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut 
evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor . . . . 
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discourage reporting and would give juries information they would be 
likely to mishandle. 
The universal admissibility of rape trauma evidence is yet another 
somewhat surprising feature of modern rape law.  An honest application 
of Daubert, let alone Frye, would at the very least generate a conflict 
among the jurisdictions.34  Instead, legislators and judges sense the 
difficulty of winning convictions even when guilt is clear, and admit 
expert testimony to bolster the persuasiveness of the prosecution.35  This 
practice may promote reliability in the sense of making accurate verdicts 
more likely, but this is an odd if not unique interpretation of reliability. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 413, and its counterparts in those states 
that have followed the lead of Congress, is yet more unusual.  Under 
Rule 413, the prosecution may prove the defendant’s past specific acts of 
sexual assault to show propensity, even when these acts did not result in 
a criminal conviction.36  Rule 413 was inspired by the acquittal of 
William Kennedy Smith, after a trial in which the judge quite correctly 
applied the standard character evidence rules to exclude proof of prior 
sexual attacks allegedly committed by Smith.37  Casting aside the 
 34. See Jane Campbell Moriarty, Wonders of the Invisible World: Prosecutorial Syndrome 
and Profile Evidence in the Salem Witchcraft Trials, 26 VT. L. REV. 43, 98 (2001). Professor 
Moriarty writes: 
In the last thirty years, there have been many studies conducted following up Burgess & 
Holstrom's initial work.  According to current literature, the general stages of the RTS 
are not supportable, although the subsequent studies confirm the finding that ‘rape 
survivors experience more depression, anxiety, fear, and social and sexual problems than 
do other women.’  Yet, the wide-ranging testimony admitted under the rubric of RTS 
neither matches the RTS stages nor the recognition that rape survivors are more 
depressed or anxious than others.  Rather, the testimony includes delays in reporting, 
reporting inconsistently about the rape, and recanting the claim of rape. 
Id.  (footnotes omitted). 
 35. See id. 
The difficulty of prosecuting rape cases is well-established, and far too few victims seek 
to prosecute these cases because of the re-experience of trauma engendered by the trial.  
But in the desire to assist the victims of these crimes, courts have often disregarded the 
need to rigorously examine the connection between victims' alleged traumatically-
induced behaviors and the crime. 
Id.  See also, Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence Law, 46 
DUKE L.J. 461, 478-91 (1996) (tracing receptivity toward syndrome evidence to political concern 
that meritorious cases for the protection of vulnerable victims will be lost without the evidence). 
 36. See FED. R. EVID. 413(a) ("In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an 
offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of 
sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is 
relevant."). 
 37. R. Wade King, Comment: Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414: By Answering the 
Public's Call for Increased  Protection from Sexual Predators, Did Congress Move too Far Toward 
Encouraging Conviction Based on Character Rather than Guilt?, 33 TX. TECH. L. REV. 1167, 1169 
9
Dripps: After Rape Law
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008
DRIPPS_FINAL 3/23/2009  3:11 PM 
966 AKRON LAW REVIEW [41:957 
 
standard distrust of propensity evidence, and the standard reluctance to 
open criminal trials to extensive proof of collateral matters, Congress 
and several states moved to reinforce the prosecution’s case in light of 
the practical difficulties the Smith case so dramatically illustrated.38 
Sadly, these departures from basic principles of both criminal law 
and the law of evidence have done little to increase the prosecution’s 
ability to win justified convictions.  Conviction rates in rape cases 
remain the lowest for any of the serious felonies.39  The system’s 
stubborn resistance to convictions in rape cases encourages the current 
pro-government drift in the substantive law.  The root problem, 
however, is the divide between elite and popular opinion about sexual 
mores and gender roles.  Before suggesting a direct and principled 
procedural attack on the problem, I briefly sketch the growing eclipse of 
the force element and the emerging focus on consent in the substantive 
law.    
II.  THE TURN TO CONSENT 
The late twentieth century reform movement did not alter the 
substantive law’s traditional formula of sex-plus-force-plus-the-absence-
of-consent.  The abolition of the resistance requirement, however, posed 
a difficult challenge for the courts.  On the one hand, the independence 
of the penetration and force elements suggested that force must be 
(2002).  King states that: 
The acquittal of Kennedy Smith in the face of numerous media reports concerning his 
prior sexual misdeeds demonstrated to a watching public the effectiveness of evidence of 
prior sexual misconduct in a sexual assault trial.  Responding to the public outcry fueled 
by these and other high-profile cases, Congress ignored the legal community's objection 
to the adoption of Rules 413 and 414, including them in the 1994 Act. 
Id.  (footnotes omitted). 
 38. Joyce R. Lombardi, Comment: Because Sex Crimes are Different: Why Maryland Should 
(Carefully) Adopt the Contested Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 that Permit Propensity 
Evidence of a Criminal Defendant's Other Sex Offenses, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 103, 116 (2004) 
(“Minus the celebrity and media attention, of course, the essential elements of the Kennedy Smith 
rape trial are found in every jurisdiction: accuser, accused, possibly forced sex, no witnesses, scant 
physical evidence.  In response, the legislatures of ten states have, as of June, 2004, adopted their 
own versions of Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415.") (footnotes omitted). 
 39. See, e.g., David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Criminal Law: Rape in the Criminal Justice 
System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1199 (1997) ("There is growing evidence that, while 
the performance of the justice system in rape cases may have improved, the legal reforms have 
generally had little or no effect on the outcomes of rape cases, or the proportions of rapists who are 
prosecuted and convicted.") (footnotes omitted); SCHULHOFER, supra note 8, at 38 ("A 
comprehensive study of six jurisdictions – Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Texas, and 
Washington, D.C. –  . . . found that only Michigan had any improvement in the reporting of rapes, 
and none of the jurisdictions had an increase in its conviction rates."). 
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extrinsic to the penetration.  On the other hand, the end of the resistance 
requirement suggested the defendant need not inflict or threaten grievous 
bodily injury to commit rape.  The general drift of the law is clear: the 
force requirement is either being eliminated or trivialized. 
Different jurisdictions are taking different routes to the same 
destination.  In Pennsylvania, the state courts gave the force requirement 
a pro-defense interpretation in Commonwealth v. Berkowitz,40 and the 
legislature responded by adopting a statute making nonconsensual sex, 
absent force, a lesser felony.41  The Commonwealth’s sentencing 
commission, however, “has assigned the offense of sexual assault to 
Level 5 of the sentencing guidelines, placing it in the same category as 
murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, 
kidnapping and arson.”42  The reform statute thus has had the same 
practical effect that would have attended a judgment for the prosecution 
in Berkowitz. 
The Pennsylvania model is fairly widespread; sixteen states now 
criminalize sex without consent and absent force, half of these 
classifying this offense as a misdemeanor.43  Although these 
jurisdictions represent a minority, they also represent an important trend.  
Not only are more states criminalizing sex without consent as such; 
jurisdictions that retain the traditional force requirement are treating it 
with increasing hostility. 
Apparently the New Jersey Supreme Court, which famously read 
the traditional force element to be established by proof of penetration 
without more,44 still stands alone.  Courts in many jurisdictions, 
 40. See Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 66 (Pa. 1994).  The Westlaw notes 
associated with the case state that: 
Evidence that victim stated ‘no’ throughout her encounter with defendant and that 
defendant pushed her on bed prior to having sexual intercourse with her was insufficient 
to establish ‘forcible compulsion’ necessary to support rape conviction; evidence 
indicated that victim was not restrained by defendant and that she could have attempted 
to leave room but did not. 
Id. at WL KeyCite [2]. 
 41. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3124.1 (2007) (“Except as provided in section 3121 (relating to 
rape) or 3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse), a person commits a felony of the 
second degree when that person engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with a 
complainant without the complainant's consent’). 
 42. Commonwealth v. Celestin, 825 A.2d 670, 681 (Pa. Super. 2003). 
 43. See Anderson, supra note 10, at 631-32 (“Sixteen states and the District of Columbia do 
criminalize sexual penetration that is non-consensual and without force.  These states, however, 
impose less punishment upon non-consensual penetration, with greater than half of them 
categorizing these offenses as mere misdemeanors.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 44. In The Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1269 (N.J. 1992) (holding that repeal of 
resistance requirement implies that force element is satisfied by proof of penetration). 
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however, have found the force requirement satisfied by such acts as 
pushing the victim’s hands away from her pants,45 or pulling the 
victim’s head toward the defendant’s penis.46  Different labels, such as 
“psychological force”47 or “constructive force,” appear in some of the 
opinions.48  Some opinions simply conclude that physical contact 
 45. See People v. Galvarino-Gonzalez, No. G028091, 2003 WL 21214264, at *6 (Ca. App. 
2003) (unpublished) (finding that the removal of secluded, mentally disabled adult victim's 
sweatpants held to satisfy force requirement). 
 46. See People v. Sadler, No. 904-2003, 2004 WL 2077780, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) 
(“Defendant's actions of grabbing the victim's arm and of pushing her head down towards his penis 
are sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that the defendant used ‘forcible compulsion’ to compel 
the victim to perform the sodomy.  This is so even though the victim did not immediately cry out or 
suffer any actual physical injury."). 
 47. See, e.g., State v. Haschenburger, No. 05 MA 192, 2007 WL 969067, at *5 (Ohio App. 
March 27, 2007) (rejecting challenge to the following forcible-rape jury instruction where the 
evidence showed continuous sexual activity between defendant, an intimate friend of victim's 
parents, with victim, aged fourteen). 
When the relationship between the victim and the defendant is one of child and parent or 
any other parental or elder authority figure, like an uncle or grandparent or stepfather, et 
cetera, the element of force need not be openly displayed or physical.  It can be subtle.  It 
can be slight.  It can be psychological.  It can be emotionally powerful.  Evidence of an 
expressed threat of harm or evidence of significant physical restraint is not required in 
that circumstance. 
Id.;  see also Commonwealth v. Pierce, 34 Phila. Co. Rptr. 548, 553 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1997) (approving 
the following jury instruction in a prosecution of defendant for sexual assaults on his granddaughter 
victim, age thirteen or fourteen: 
The force used or threat may be physical force or violence, but it does not have to be.  It 
is legally possible for an individual to commit rape by using or threatening intellectual, 
moral, emotional or psychological force . . . I'm speaking of something very different 
from the sort of argument, persuasion or seduction that might induce a female 
voluntarily to consent to intercourse.  A man's words or conduct toward a female cannot 
amount to the use of threat of intellectual, moral, emotional and psychological force 
unless they wrongfully impair her freedom of will and her ability to choose whether to 
have sex with the man. 
Id.; State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 735 (R.I. 1987) (holding “[a] threat may consist of the imposition 
of psychological pressure on one who, under the circumstances, is vulnerable and susceptible to 
such pressure”). 
 48. For example, in Commonwealth v. Martin, 630 S.E.2d 291, 292 (Va. 2006), defendant, 
age fourteen, instructed victim, age eight, to masturbate defendant.  The court upheld a conviction 
under a statute that made "sexual abuse" of one below the age of consent an aggravated form of 
"sexual abuse," sexual abuse being defined as forcing victim to touch defendant's intimate parts.  Id.  
The opinion seems to conflate force with the absence of consent: 
Equally long-standing is the principle that in the context of sexual crimes, an act 
undertaken against a victim's will and without the victim's consent is an act undertaken 
with force.  Again, in the context of a rape prosecution, we held that constructive force 
exists if the victim could not legally consent to the act.  Proof of the absence of legal 
consent provides “all the force which the law demands as an element of the crime.”  For 
these reasons, we reject Martin's contention that as used in Code § 18 2-67.10(6) “force” 
means actual force, and we conclude that “force” includes actual and constructive force 
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extrinsic to penetration establishes force on the facts of the instant 
case.49  Whatever the doctrinal rhetoric, the theme remains that when 
consent is clearly absent courts will bend over backwards to find force. 
Despite occasional reaffirmations of a robust force requirement,50 
the trend toward basing liability entirely, or at least primarily, on the 
absence of consent appears to be strong.  In most of these cases there are 
aggravating circumstances, such as the youth (or even infancy) of the 
victim or the defendant’s position of authority over the victim.51  The 
generous definition of force, however, is not restricted to these egregious 
and that constructive force includes engaging in proscribed conduct with a victim who is 
under the legal age of consent. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fuller, 845 N.E.2d 434, 442 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 2006) (summarizing that victim was mentally handicapped and intoxicated at defendant's 
apartment; the rape conviction was affirmed, court approving instruction that “if the jury finds that 
there was constructive or circumstantial force by reason of the total circumstances and the attributes 
of the person involved, including age, size, sophistication, location, and other circumstances, then 
the jury can find that there was constructive or circumstantial force.");  State v. Locklear, 616 
S.E.2d 334, 338 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding rape conviction of defendant, father of victim, age 
fifteen, finding evidence sufficient to show "constructive force");  Martin v. State, 686 A.2d 1130, 
1157-59 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (explaining that Defendant, a police officer, armed, uniformed, 
and on duty, picked up victim, an intoxicated adult lost on the road; victim feigned sleep during 
foreign-object penetration; conviction upheld based on constructive force theory).  See also Powe v. 
State, 597 So.2d 721, 728 (Ala. 1992) (concluding “a jury could reasonably infer that [the 
defendant] held a position of authority and domination with regard to his daughter sufficient to 
allow the inference of an implied threat to her if she refused to comply with his demands”); People 
v. Bailey, 675 N.Y.S.2d 706, 708 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding that a “jury could reasonably 
infer that the sexual contact was perpetrated by forcible compulsion” based on the size and age 
difference between the victim and the defendant and the victim's perception of the defendant's 
authority). 
 49. See, e.g., Galvarino-Gonzalez, 2003 WL 21214264, at *6; Sadler, 798 N.Y.S. 347, *2; 
State v. Spencer, 50 S.W.3d 869, 873-74 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding forcible rape and forcible 
sodomy convictions against defendant, counselor of victim, age sixteen, known by defendant to be 
schizophrenic).  The opinion notes: 
Defendant also exerted actual physical force as to A.G.  She testified that defendant 
touched her stomach and “proceeded to fondle” her breasts under her shirt.  A.G. further 
testified that defendant grabbed her and “pulled” her up by her arms and then he “bent” 
her over the chair and unzipped her pants.  Defendant exerted physical force by grabbing 
A.G.'s arm and pulling her up and bending her over a chair. 
Id. 
 50. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 589 N.E.2d 241, 243 (1992) (explaining victim lived in a room in 
a house with defendant and defendant's wife; defendant asked victim to have sex three times; victim 
refused twice and finally "just let him have it;" conviction reversed for insufficient proof of force); 
State v. Collins, 508 S.E.2d 390 (Ga. 1998) (explaining defendant was convicted of forcible rape, 
statutory rape, and incest of victim, age twelve; forcible rape conviction reversed, as state must 
prove actual force to sustain conviction of forcible rape of underage victim). 
 51. For example, in Galvarino-Gonzalez, the victim was mentally handicapped.  See 
Galvarino-Gonzalez, 2003 WL 21214264, at *1.  In Sadler, the defendant was on the staff of a 
state-run juvenile facility where the victim was confined.  Sadler, 798 N.Y.S. 347. at *1. 
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cases, as the statutory language is typically the same with respect to the 
force element of all of a jurisdiction’s forcible sex offenses.52  The 
reported cases are almost all affirmances; the limiting factor is the 
willingness of juries to convict, not of appellate courts to reverse. 
Indeed, the least radical innovation, from a doctrinal point of view, 
is really the most radical from a practical point of view.  Consensual 
sexual encounters very often involve the sort of incidental pushing and 
pulling of clothes and limbs some of the cases characterize as force in 
the absence of consent.  The effect is to expand criminal liability to 
cover a great many cases, perhaps most cases, in which consent is 
absent.  Any record with sufficient proof of no consent is likely to 
contain sufficient evidence of force so construed. 
There is, however, little agreement on just what “consent” means.  
State statutes typically use the term without defining it, and when 
statutes attempt to define consent explicitly they may muddy the waters 
even further.53  There are fairly rigorous definitions in the theoretical 
literature,54 but legislators can be counted on not to take sides on 
controversial issues they can avoid. 
In large measure this accounts for the steady drift of the law away 
from force and toward consent.  Who can be in favor of sex without 
consent?  Legislatures can make sex without consent a crime and leave 
the difficult task of drawing lines and setting priorities to prosecutors.  
Appellate courts can do the same by expanding the meaning of “force.”  
Appellate courts, moreover, are typically asked to broaden the meaning 
of force in cases where the absence of consent is patent and the 
defendant particularly odious; the cases involving forcible rape of 
children beneath the age of consent are illustrative.55 
Could this turn to consent normalize rape law?  Could, that is, a 
general criminal prohibition on sex without consent make many times 
more people than the system can process facially guilty of serious 
crimes, so that the difficult normative judgments would be left to the 
 52. SCHULHOFER, supra note 8, at 27-40 (regarding rape law reforms). 
 53. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6, (defining consent as "positive cooperation in act or 
attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will.  The person must act freely and voluntarily and have 
knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction involved.").  Isn't that helpful? 
 54. The rigorous definitions – performative, attitudinal, or normative – of course conflict with 
each other in some cases.  See generally Symposium, Consent and Sexual Relations, 2 LEGAL 
THEORY 89 (1996). 
 55. State v. Haschenburger, No. 05 MA 192, 2007 WL 969067, at *5 (Ohio App. March 27, 
2007); Galvarino-Gonzalez, 2003 WL 21214264, at *6; Commonwealth v. Martin, 630 S.E.2d 291, 
292 (Va. 2006); State v. Locklear, 616 S.E.2d 334, 338 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005);  People v. Bailey, 675 
N.Y.S.2d 706, 708 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). 
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opaque and unconstrained discretion of prosecutors?  In the typical 
felony case, involving robbery or narcotics, the typical jury is at least as 
punitive as the typical prosecutor.  As a result, the check of trial by jury 
— which the defendant can exercise only with the risk of additional 
years in prison for insisting on trial — is only a modest check on 
prosecutorial discretion. 
Rape cases are different.  Juries represent popular, rather than elite, 
opinion, and popular opinion in rape cases can be decidedly pro-defense.  
Nor does there seem any great likelihood of changing popular opinion, 
or overcoming it by changes in rules of evidence or procedure.  I turn 
now to substantiating these assertions. 
III. WHY THE TURN TO CONSENT WON’T NORMALIZE RAPE LAW 
Popular opinion diverges from elite opinion about sexual mores and 
gender roles.  Elite opinion celebrates autonomy — including female 
autonomy.56  Popular opinion continues to regard male sexual 
aggression as natural and admirable, and to regard female sexual activity 
as dissolute and vulgar.  The elite believe that what happens between 
two consenting adults in private is, in the famous phrase of the 
Wolfenden Report, “not the law’s business.”57  Meanwhile popular 
opinion, confronted with a sexually active man and a sexually active 
woman, sees not two morally equivalent hedonists, but a 
58 
In their monumental review of the literature, David Bryden and 
Sonja Lengnick concluded in 1997 that the available jury research 
confirmed the findings of Kalven and Zeisel’s work with jury 
deliberations back in the 1950’s: juries are reluctant to convict in 
acquaintance-rape and sexually
ing in 2002, observed that: 
Other studies of public attitudes reveal the same bias: factors 
associated with traditional romance cut against any determination of 
rape. The more involved the relationship the man and woman had 
 56. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); SCHULHOFER, supra note 8; 
Anderson, supra note 8. 
 57. HOME OFFICE, REPORT ON COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, 
1957-8, Cmnd. 247, § 61 (John Wolfenden, Chair). 
 58. See, e.g., A.Y. Siu, The Slut/Stud Double Standard, available at 
http://www.psychocats.net/essays/slutstuddoublestandard (last visited November 1, 2007) 
("Everyone – even backlash-prone, conservative anti-feminists – agrees that there is a slut-stud 
double standard."). 
 59. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 39, at 1254-84 (reviewing research). 
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before the incident and the more romantic it appears, the more 
reluctant people are to characterize forced sex as rape. Evidence that 
the man paid for the woman’s food or entertainment on a date also 
predisposes third parties to noncriminal judgments about allegations of 
forced sex. Evidence that the woman had been drinking or was dressed 
provocatively inclines decision makers against a criminal judgment. 
Nor do these factors operate simply as inferences about credibility 
concerning allegations of force.  Many seem to use them in a 
normative fashion to judge comparative fault in a situation where 
something clearly went wrong. Many recognize a kind of provocation 
excuse for men, that where the woman acted in a sufficiently enticing 
way — if  she indicated sexual interest, directly or indirectly, so 
provoking the man to full sexual arousal – the man’s disregard of her 
non-consen
xcused.  
Linda Fairstein, the well-known New York prosecutor, confirms the 
social science from a blood-under-the-nails perspective.  She declared in 
1993: “Although our laws now permit us to prosecute them, not until we 
are able to inform and educate the public – the men and women who 
serve on our juries – will we be
y of acquaintance rape.”61 
The familiar jury myth of “justified rape” is very much still with us.  
When the victim met the defendant at a pick-up bar, or asked the 
defendant into her room, or accepts a ride home from him, jurors remain 
willing to believe that she asked for what she got.  Such opin
over, seem about as common among women as among men.62 
If the root problem is, as Professor Bryden concludes after deep 
research, jury reluctance to convict men accused of raping women who 
have violated traditional sexual mores, the turn to consent will fail to 
normalize rape law.63  Prosecutorial discretion will be constrained not 
just by the cost of trial, a cost all felony defendants may bargain with, 
but also by a high risk of acquittal at trial, an asset most felony 
 60. Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes Against the Heart: Recognizing the Wrongs of Forced Sex, 
35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 845, 876-77 (2002) (footnotes omitted). 
 61. LINDA FAIRSTEIN, SEXUAL VIOLENCE OUR WAR AGAINST RAPE 136 (1993). 
 62. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 39, at 1204-08; FAIRSTEIN, supra note 61, at 137. 
 63. See Bryden, supra note 16, at 425. 
At least until recently, jurors’ biases against imprudent, norm-violating women have 
been a major obstacle to convictions in acquaintance-rape cases even when the man 
allegedly used considerable force.  To the extent that legally improper prejudices are still 
a factor, changing the legal standard is not going to solve the problem.  
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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defendants do not enjoy.  We can expect legislatures and courts to 
continue trying to help the prosecution by legal interpretations, and by 
evidentiary rules and rulings, that would not be forthcoming outside the 
sexual assault context.  And we can continue to expect that these 
heterodox maneuvers will fail to secure conv
s that prevail for other types of felonies. 
Might popular opinion some day come around?  On civil rights 
issues generally there has been progress in popular, as well as elite, 
opinion.  That progress, however, seems to have bypassed popular 
understandings of sexual morality.  The Bryden and Lengnick literature 
review, for example, found that while the evidence is not unmixed, there 
was little change between the Kalven and Zeisel study, based 
g back to the 1950’s, and research conducted in the 1990’s. 
Moreover, popular culture, the ally of progress on so many civil 
rights issues, sends very mixed signals indeed regarding gender roles 
and sexual autonomy.  For every “Sex and the City” episode there is a 
misogynistic song lyric or the like.  If we include bona fide pornography, 
advertising, and the publicity attending the sex lives of celebrities in the 
world of sports and entertainment, it would be a bright-eyed optimist 
indeed who expects a sudden sea-change in popular attitudes.  It will 
probably happen eventually, but as 
IV.  NORMALIZED RAPE LAW: A GAME WORTH THE CANDLE? 
If popular opinion were somehow removed as a check on 
prosecutorial discretion, the turn to consent could indeed normalize rape 
law.  It is worth dwelling at least briefly on what a normalized law of 
sexual assault would look like.  Neither the legislators approving 
statutory penalties for nonconsensual sex, nor the appellate judges 
broadening the meaning of force, really believe that all sex obtained 
without the victim’s consent should be criminal.  And if they did, the 
resource constraints facing the criminal justice system prec
even-handed enforcement of a consent-based regime. 
Consider three examples.  The first example is quid pro quo sexual 
harassment at the workplace.  After Lawrence, it would seem 
unconstitutional to impose even civil liability for consensual sex.  The 
positive law arguably accommodates Lawrence by requiring the plaintiff 
 64. JOHN M. KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (1923).   
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plaintiff voluntarily accepted it.65  So, it follows that actionable quid pro 
quo sexual harassment also violates those sixteen state statutes that 
criminalize sex without consent.  Moreover, if the harasser had improper 
physical contact well before the penetration, or behaved in a badgering 
or threatening way, or moved the victim’s limbs in the course of the sex 
act, the harasser might well satisfy the generous definitions of force in 
some of the cases. 
Consider a second example.  In many battering relationships, 
women initiate sex, or acquiesce in the abuser’s advances, to avoid being 
beaten up.  We can say clearly that the sexual harassment case is not 
consensual.  Here there seems philosophical ground for debate (in one 
sense victim consents, but in another sense her consent is tainted by 
defendant’s prior violence).  One can find cases that go both ways.66  If 
we do decide that sex against a background of domestic violence is rape, 
someone would have to select, from the millions of abusive but not 
celibate relationships in the country, which ones to prosecute as major 
felonies.67 
The third example is sexual fraud.  Take the not uncommon case of 
statutory rape by a man who claims the victim misrepresented her age.  
The majority view is that mistake of age is no defense.  That rule, 
however, does not insulate the female from liability for rape under a 
pure consent formula.68  Had she told the (statutory) rapist her age, he 
 65. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) ("[T]he fact that sex-related 
conduct was ‘voluntary,’ in the sense that the complainant was not forced to participate against her 
will, is not a defense to a sexual harassment suit brought under Title VII.  The gravamen of any 
sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were ‘unwelcome.’”).  See also Elsie 
Mata, Note, Title VII Quid pro Quo and Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims: Changing 
the Framework Courts Use to Determine Whether Challenged Conduct is Unwelcome, 34 U. MICH. 
J. L. REFORM  791, 810-15 (2001). 
 66. Compare People v. Voymas, 833 N.Y.S.2d 823, 824 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (upholding 
forcible compulsion conviction when defendant, a child, acquiesced because she had learned from 
experience that she would be hurt worse if she did not cooperate) with State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 
470, 476 (N.C. 1984) (finding that defendant, at that time victim's boyfriend, had beaten victim 
months before charged rape; prior violence held insufficient to establish force). 
 67. See, e.g., Melanie Randall, Deconstructing the “Image” of the Battered Woman: 
Domestic Violence and the Construction of "Ideal Victim”: Assaulted Women's "Image Problems" 
in Law, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 107, 113 (2004) ("Research has consistently demonstrated 
that approximately one in four women has experienced some kind of physical violence or physical 
assault in an intimate relationship with a male partner."). 
 68. See Russell L. Christopher & Kathryn H. Christopher, Adult Impersonation: Rape by 
Fraud as a Defense to Statutory Rape, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 75, 76-77 (2007).  The authors note: 
By obtaining intercourse with the nineteen-year-old through a false representation of a 
significant or material matter, the fifteen-year old commits rape by fraud. The age of 
one's sexual partner is a crucially significant and material matter when it makes the 
difference between lawful intercourse and criminal intercourse (statutory rape).  
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would not have had sex with her (and perhaps he can prove this, by 
showing instances in which he shied away from other underage women 
in the past). 
Misrepresentations to obtain sex are ubiquitous and increasingly 
susceptible of proof in this age of liaisons arranged via the internet.  
Which of these should be selected for prosecution?  Under a pure-
consent statute, all of the sexual harassers, all of the deceivers, and many 
of the abusers are facially guilty of rape.  Yet these cases are not 
prosecuted.  What explains the pattern of non-enforcement? 
A number of factors are at work.  One, probably more prominent 
than academic observers may realize, is the tremendous caseload 
pressure throughout the system.  Sex crimes units struggle just to 
process the aggravated cases; until they have more resources than 
aggravated cases, only the aggravated cases will be charged.69  Another 
is very likely prosecutorial perception of juror prejudice.70  If 
prosecutors have a tough time winning convictions in the aggravated 
cases, why should they reach for cases in which guilty verdicts are even 
more unlikely? 
The most likely explanation, however, is that prosecutors do not 
view sexual harassment, consent framed by an abusive relationship, or 
sexual fraud as crimes, even when the language of a local statute says 
otherwise.  In this respect at least rape law is normalized even now; the 
existing penalty structure covers far more conduct, with far more 
severity, than any one wants to see actually imposed; legislatures have 
left the hard normative questions to prosecutors.  Sex obtained by tactics 
that meet with elite acceptance are thus insulated from liability in the 
same way as other offenses enjoying elite acceptance, such as drug use 
by middle-class youth. 
Rape exceptionalism persists in those cases — the acquaintance-
rape and “justified rape” cases — where elite opinion would impose 
liability and popular opinion will not.  There is a great deal of political 
irony in this.  In the one area where trial by jury actually constrains 
prosecutorial discretion, it turns out that prosecutors are enlightened and 
Exposure to criminal liability for statutory rape, and the possibility of punishment of up 
to twenty-years' imprisonment, or even imprisonment for life, is as significant and 
material as virtually any consequence imaginable. 
Id. 
 69. See FAIRSTEIN, supra note 61, at 152 (discussing resource constraints on sex-crimes 
prosecutions). 
 70. See, e.g., Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 39, at 1246-55 (discussing reluctance of 
prosecutors to try long-shot rape prosecutions). 
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jurors are retrograde.  The turn to consent will do nothing to change the 
outcomes in those cases, which are blocked now, not by the law, but by 
the unwillingness to enforce it.  All the turn to consent will do is 
increase — vastly  increase — the facial coverage of the criminal law. 
It would be possible to define consent operationally, by, for 
example, a no-means-no statute that punishes sex in the face of 
expressed refusal.  That type of statute would be narrowly drawn enough 
to cabin prosecutorial discretion; sexual cooperation obtained by 
debatable inducements would be presumed noncriminal until the 
legislature says otherwise.71  Even no-means-no laws, however, are at 
odds with popular sexual mores.  If the meaning of consent were 
operationalized in a narrower way, as by deeming criminal even 
cooperation absent affirmative expressions of consent,72 we would be 
expanding the facial range of liability even more broadly than under 
current consent statutes, without any prospect of winning convictions 
from juries or of fairly selecting cases to be tried. 
V.  TAKING CONSENT SERIOUSLY 
Depressing as the foregoing discussion undoubtedly is, it leads me 
to make a constructive proposal.  The basic idea is straight-forward: 
where sex without consent is a separate crime (a lesser-included offense 
of forcible rape or its statutory equivalent), the legislature should 
authorize trial by the court in specialized tribunals with no authority to 
impose more than six months in jail.  The Supreme Court’s Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence permits this procedure.73 
The advantage of this approach is the direct bypass of popular 
prejudice.  Defense efforts to characterize the defendant’s disregard of 
his victim’s will could not so easily be painted as somehow justified by 
her misconduct, or earned by his prior intimacy with her.  I see two 
objections, both plausible but neither persuasive. 
The first is that the six-month sentence depreciates the seriousness 
of the offense (a point unfortunately emphasized by the “petty offense” 
rubric in Baldwin).74  There are, however, three reasons to reject this 
 71. I previously advocated just such an approach, see Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An 
Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1780 (1992), and continue to believe it offers the best doctrinal formulation for current 
circumstances.  I have, however, come to agree with Professor Bryden that the root problem in this 
area is cultural rather than legal. 
 72. For such proposals, see, for example, SCHULHOFER, supra note 8; Anderson, supra note 8. 
 73. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 70-71 (1970). 
 74. See id. at 72-74. 
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argument.  First, compared to what happens now in most acquaintance-
rape and “justified rape” cases, the proposal dramatically increases the 
penalty likely to be imposed in practice.  Prosecutors confident of 
winning a jury trial would remain free to file charges in the regular 
felony court.  The special misdemeanor court would be an option, not a 
requirement. 
Second, the six-month limit might be expanded by such approaches 
as consecutive sentences for distinct counts, recidivism enhancements, 
and use of convictions as predicates for classification under the sexual 
predator laws.  One obvious possibility is to include hefty fines along 
with the jail sentence.  Some of these options are dishonest, and some 
might not withstand constitutional scrutiny.  Nonetheless the six-month 
limit on its face invites creative prosecutors to see what might be tacked 
on in cases that call for heightened punishment. 
Third, U.S. sentences are the highest in the Western world.75  Many 
of the challenges the system faces arise from desperate attempts to avoid 
imposing draconian maxima legislators routinely vote for but don’t want 
enforced.  If we are going to have rape-law exceptionalism, we might as 
well include something, like reduced penalties coupled to simpler 
procedures, that might well make sense for the system at large in due 
time.  At any rate, if the objection is that a proposed sentence is too 
lenient compared to our current practice, one good rejoinder is that our 
current practice is too harsh. 
The second objection is that normalizing rape prosecutions would 
be a bad idea, because the normal system concentrates far too much 
power in the hands of prosecutors.  This objection finds considerable 
support in the Duke lacrosse case.76  It took very good defense lawyers 
working full-time, plus a stroke of luck, to prove that the prosecution 
 75. See, e.g., Alice Ristoph, Criminal Law: Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1307 (2006): 
As of June 2005, the United States had over 2.1 million inmates in its prisons and jails 
and the highest per capita rate of incarceration in the world – 738 inmates per 100,000 
residents.  The U.S. prison population has continued to rise even as crime rates have 
dropped.  The size of the inmate population is largely a result of much longer prison 
sentences than those imposed in other Western democracies, and these longer sentences 
can be traced to changes in sentencing policy (as opposed to increases in criminal 
behavior).  Specifically, longer prison sentences can be traced to mandatory sentences, 
increased penalties for drug crimes, the abolition of parole in many jurisdictions, and an 
increasing tendency to impose prison terms rather than non-carceral sentences. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 76. For a summary of the case, see, for example, Duke Office of News Communication, 
Looking Back at the Duke Lacrosse Case, http://news.duke.edu/lacrosseincident (last visited 
November 1, 2007) (official Duke permanent website about the case). 
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had withheld exculpatory evidence.77  Most rape defendants won’t have 
that kind of legal team or that kind of luck. 
Indeed, prosecutorial misconduct is far from uncommon in the 
normal system.  The Duke defendants had the benefit of an open-file 
discovery law passed after North Carolina prosecutors withheld 
exculpatory evidence in the capital murder prosecution of Alan Gell, 
who was acquitted after retrial and is apparently innocent.78  The 
responsible prosecutors were reprimanded, but that was all.79  Mike 
Nifong might have gotten away with gross misconduct, and he might 
have gotten away with prosecuting upper-class men accused of raping a 
lower-class woman.  From a purely tactical perspective, his mistake was 
doing both of these things in the same case. 
Prosecutorial misconduct is only one downside to the current scope 
of prosecutorial power.  Even when prosecutors honor their various 
obligations to fair play, they still make momentous charging decisions, 
in secret, according to no public criteria.  Even if jury sympathy for rape 
defendants is unjustified, it might be that removing this check on 
prosecutorial discretion would invite a still worse regime of arbitrary 
discrimination among similarly situated cases.  Drug-law enforcement 
suggests a troubling analogy. 
The objection is powerful, and indeed when lodged against the 
system as a whole, it is compellingly persuasive.80  To deploy the 
objection to excessive prosecutorial power in the narrow context of 
sexual assault cases, however, is less compelling.  The very power of the 
objection suggests that some new arrangements must be found, and 
therefore ultimately will be found, to regulate the concentration of power 
 77. For an account of how the defense managed to undermine the prosecution's case, see 
Samson Habte,  Prosecutorial Injustice Commonplace, Says Duke Lacrosse Rape Case Attorney, 
VIRGINIA LAW, Oct. 18, 2007, http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2007_fall/cooney.htm. 
 78. See id. for the proposition that: 
The outcry provoked by Gell’s case led to the passage of the Open File Discovery Law 
in the North Carolina legislature.  “If it wasn’t for that law, we’d be in the middle of a 
jury trial in Durham right now because there is no way Mr. Nifong would have given us 
evidence showing our clients were innocent,” Cooney [George P. Conney III, one of the 
defense lawyers in the Duke case] said, “There is no way he would have shared the 
weaknesses of his files. 
Id. 
 79. See, e.g., Joseph Neff, N.C. Prosecutors Stifled Evidence: Lawyer Now Retreats from 
Testimony, CHARLOTTE NEWS OBSERVER, Dec. 19, 2004, available at 
http://www.newsobserver.com/208/story/249929.html (modified October 23, 2005). 
 80. For an overview of the criticism of the current scope of prosecutorial power, and some 
possible response to the challenge that power presents, see Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization, 
Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit Strategies, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1155 (2005). 
22
Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 4, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss4/6
DRIPPS_FINAL 3/23/2009  3:11 PM 
2008] AFTER RAPE LAW 979 
 
in executive hands.  Indeed, my proposal is animated in part by the hope 
that it might illuminate a path toward a new normal, in which reduced 
penalties, simplified procedures, and greater accountability restore a 
measure of the distinction between substance and procedure in criminal 
justice. 
Even if no new normal emerged, a special sex-crimes court makes 
sense, given the gap between elite and popular opinion.  There would of 
course be a price paid, in diminished legitimacy and enhanced executive 
power.  I would be surprised (pleasantly surprised, but surprised 
nonetheless) if the prosecutions brought in the special proceedings I 
propose did not disproportionately target men from lower socioeconomic 
strata, with a corresponding racial tilt.  We have been willing to live with 
this arrangement in the drug context on the theory that the distribution 
across classes of the benefits of enforcement tracks the distribution of 
the costs.81  In the context of sexual assault, the benefits seem less 
ambiguous, and the costs, given the six month limit, seem far less 
onerous. 
Some prosecutors might very well push the envelope, by charging 
such conduct as quid pro quo employment discrimination.  I suspect that 
this would be so unpopular that legislatures might be forced to make a 
few of the hard normative choices explicit in statutory language, or 
(more likely) that popular protest would induce prosecutors to stick to 
the type of aggravated cases they are bringing (and often losing) now. 
I can imagine civil libertarians objecting to an end-run around trial 
by jury, but this objection is frivolous.  Plea bargaining now denies 
almost all defendants trial by jury.  At least defendants in the 
proceedings I propose could not be punished more than a few months in 
jail for electing to be tried.  We might draw an analogy to the law’s 
response to domestic violence.  The now common civil protection order 
provides the predicate for criminal contempt charges that can be tried 
summarily.  The CPO is not a panacea, but it has enhanced the physical 
security of countless women.  It also rides roughshod over the tradition 
of trial by jury.  If the substantive law be just, and the Constitution 
permits an instrumentally reliable procedure for vindicating that just 
substance, romantic appeals to ancient but dysfunctional institutions 
should not stand in the way. 
 81. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Essay: Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 
1798 (1998) ("The system's treatment of crack relative to other drugs is a kind of paternalism that 
purports to favor rather than harms black neighborhoods."). 
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VI. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A NEW NORMAL IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
I have no general antipathy toward trial by jury.  So far as I know, 
no nation with a system of trial by jury in criminal cases suffered a 
thorough-going police state during the twentieth century.  Numerous and 
various are those lands without jury trial that succumbed to 
totalitarianism during the same period.  To say that jury trial is a 
valuable hedge against tyranny, however, is not to say that jury trial 
should be had in every case.  Its checking value will remain so long as 
the accused has a genuine option.  The current system is flawed by 
making the alternative to jury trial a plea of guilty.  We might do a much 
better job of accommodating the option of jury trial as a check on 
tyranny with the needless cost of jury trial in routine cases. 
We might, for instance, offer some sort of hearing, according to 
appealable criteria, before the prosecutors who make the practically 
dispositive charging decision.  We might, as an alternative, offer all 
defendants trial before a panel of a judge and two lay persons, with a 
fixed sentencing enhancement for those who elect and lose a trial by 
jury.  Whatever approach we take, the turn to consent will put that 
approach to a difficult test.  Can we devise an institutional arrangement 
that would either force legislatures to make the hard choices about the 
substantive law (what, really, do we mean by “consent”?), or one in 
which we trust prosecutors to make these decisions in the same way we 
trust administrative agencies to make the hard choices about business 
regulation and environmental protection?  The prospect seems distant 
but far from hopeless.  Perhaps the concentration of power in 
prosecutorial hands in a system that permitted bypassing the jury in 
sexual assault cases might be the catalyst that calls forth successful 
reforms far more general in scope. 
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